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Background
Professor Gal, who teaches at the University of Haifa, has produced a
delightfully clear and remarkably sensible book devoted to the problems of
formulating competition policy, or antitrust law, in such small economies
as Israel. Appreciating her contribution requires some background, which I
will sketch out before describing the book in greater detail. Also, because
Professor Gal has chosen to apply herself in this book to a problem of
sharply limited scope, I will attempt to generalize some of her insights.
Market reforms are popular around the world now that communism is
defunct. But markets do not work well if they are not competitive. Recent
work by Wallsten and others, for example, demonstrates a striking cross-
country difference in the performance of privatized firms, depending on
whether they face competition; it appears that privatization alone
accomplishes little Antitrust law is regarded as necessary, therefore, to
support such market reforms as privatization. Many countries have now
adopted American-style competition policy, or its close European cousin,
at least partly because there are few other models.
Although Professor Gal limits her focus solely to competition policy,
and largely to countries with well-established and functional legal systems,
the issues she addresses exemplify a broader class of difficulties associated
with recent attempts to export Western legal systems to "transitional"
(formerly Communist) or developing (formerly Third World) countries.
Widespread agreement that the "rule of law" is an important economic
goal for any country is based on influential analyses suggesting an
t The author is the Gordon Cain Senior Fellow in Stanford University's Institute for
Economic Policy Research. He was formerly chief economist of the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice and has consulted with the World Bank and several developing nations on
competition policy issues.
1 See, e.g., SCOTT J. WALLSTEN, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF COMPETITION,
PRIVATIZATION, AND REGULATION IN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA 2 (World Bank Group, Policy
Research Working Paper No. 2136, 1999), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/docs/553.pdf (last
visited April 10. 2004) ("[C]ompetition is the most effective agent of change, privatization without
regulation may not improve service, and regulation is especially important when privatizing a
monopoly incumbent.").
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important connection between economic success and legal structure, such
as those associated with the economic historian Douglass North.2 Law that
supports a productive and growing market economy is like the hidden steel
scaffolding that supports a building. The design of the scaffolding is no
less important to the size and stability of the building than the strength of
the steel. In particular, the design must interactively support the building's
other functional systems. In an economy, the link between the structure of
law and the efficiency of economic activity is one of incentives that are
based on expectations of what courts-or, more accurately, the legal
system as a whole-will do in various contingencies.
An obvious example, coming back to antitrust, is price fixing.
Antitrust law deters some price fixing by creating an expectation among
sellers that collusion will be, with some probability, detected and penalized
by fines and private damage liability. This reduces ex ante the expected
profitability of price fixing. The optimal amount of undetected price fixing
activity is not zero, however. Detection and punishment are costly and
must be weighed against their social benefits. Also, there are trade-offs to
be made between the severity of punishments and investment in detection.
Most important, the costs of inadvertently deterring beneficial economic
behavior that may be mistaken for price fixing, and other costly
unintended consequences, must be considered. Both the substance of the
law and the outcomes of particular cases matter economically because, and
only because, of their effects on the incentives, mediated by expectations,
of future economic actors. Clearly, designing a price fixing law and the
associated enforcement regime that most nearly optimizes the incentives of
economic actors is a technically challenging, fact-specific task. The result
will be different from one context and country to another. The same
considerations apply to laws on monopolization, mergers, and other
restraints of trade.
From this it follows that there are three serious problems with the
widespread importation of U.S.-style antitrust law.
Problem T: Tailoring. U.S. antitrust law and enforcement standards
may be inappropriate in other economies with different business and
economic environments. One example is merger policy in small and
isolated economies where demand is insufficient to support multiple
suppliers operating at efficient scales. Such problems are most serious in
an economy isolated, by distance or otherwise, from trade-in other
words, from foreign suppliers. This is the focus of Professor Gal's book.
Nevertheless, transitional and developing economies present similar
issues.
2 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990) [hereinafter NORTH, INSTITUTIONS], DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND




Problem G: Geography. Sound antitrust analysis and enforcement
must always focus on markets. Countries, economies and jurisdictions are
not the same as markets. There is, for example, a world market for certain
kinds of steel, while markets for ready-mix concrete are regional; neither
corresponds to a jurisdiction. Very seldom do "relevant antitrust markets"
3
correspond closely with jurisdictional boundaries. This creates technical
problems in gathering information, threatens overlapping and potentially
conflicting enforcement, and severely limits potential remedies. Far worse,
it facilitates policy enforcement that promotes intra-jurisdictional
economic welfare at the expense of extra-jurisdictional consumers. This
problem worsens as globalization expands markets throughout the world.
It takes an act of faith to conclude that antitrust enforcement within
jurisdictional bounds is an improvement in global economic welfare. Yet
international coordination and cooperation in competition policy is,
essentially, nonexistent.
Problem L: Law. In any country, antitrust law must operate chiefly
through its effects on the expectations and incentives of economic actors
rather than through the direct regulation of each transaction. Therefore, the
economic effects of antitrust policy are mediated by the legal system and
other determinants of economic actors' expectations. National legal
systems are unique, both in substance and procedure, as are the economic
and political histories that influence expectations. It follows that, even if
they are "correct" for the United States or the European Union, standard
antitrust policies are very unlikely to produce optimal results elsewhere.
Professor Gal quite explicitly devotes her book chiefly to problem T,
as advertised, and does a nice job of it within the confines of "small
economies," as she defines them. She recognizes but does little to confront
problem G, which is not surprising because problem G is likely to be
intractable. Problem L is analytically interesting, important in legal reform
generally, and probably tractable. However, she has almost entirely
neglected problem L, a significant shortcoming in a book about antitrust
policy. In deciding not to treat this crucial issue, unfortunately, Professor
Gal is in the mainstream of antitrust commentary.
Problem T: The Need To Tailor Antitrust
Antitrust or competition policy is now de rigueur everywhere in the
world. According to Professor Gal, roughly 100 nations already have, or
are in the process of adopting, antitrust laws.4 These include countries as
3 The process of defining the relevant market is a crucial first step in most antitrust cases.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1
(1992, revised 1997) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES].
4 MICHAL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES 9 (2003).
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large as China5 and as small as Trinidad and Tobago.6 The popularity of
antitrust laws reflects the recent trend of market reforms and trade
liberalization. In developing countries and former Soviet republics the
establishment of competition enforcement policy has been successfully
urged by the various multilateral development organizations.7 The United
States Department of Justice and other U.S. agencies provide training
programs and other assistance for the professionals in charge of
establishing and enforcing these new laws.8  The E.U. competition
authority also has advisory and technical assistance programs for
developing countries.
9
The United States, by reason of having started earlier,' has by far the
most experience with and knowledge of competition policy, including a
vast scholarly literature l' and many hundreds of reported cases. Not
surprisingly, U.S. competition enforcement policies and the theories
behind them have been widely adopted in other countries. This is not mere
form. The professional staffs of most antitrust agencies have been trained
in U.S. universities or by U.S. antitrust lawyers and economists. If one
reads the reports of antitrust proceedings in, say, Costa Rica, 12 one would
be pressed to distinguish either the substance or the quality of the analysis
5 MINISTER ZHONGFU WANG, STATE ADMIN. FOR INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE, P.R.C.,
COMPETITION POLICY STATEMENT, http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/China/Policy/cnpoll.html (last
visited Mar. 26, 2004); see also P.R.C., ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW, DRAFT FOR SUBMISSION FOR REVIEW
(Oct. 2002) (unofficial translation) (on file with Yale Journal on Regulation).
6 TRIPARTITE COMM., ORG. OF AM. STATES, INVENTORY OF DOMESTIC LAWS AND
REGULATIONS RELATING TO COMPETITION POLICY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE § 9 (2002),
available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ngroups/NGCP/Publications/domlaws-e.asp (last visited April
10, 2004).
7 In Argentina, for example, the World Bank insisted that the Executive Authority propose
an antitrust law to the legislature as the condition for a loan to facilitate privatization of the steel
industry. For the result, see ECONOMISTS INC., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY TEAM ON COMPETITION
POLICY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN ARGENTINA (1992). The recommendations were enacted in
1999 but are now under review. See Law No. 25156, Aug. 15, 1999, [29233] B.O. 5. (Arg.).
8 The Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission foreign training and assistance
programs are described in FED. TRADE COMM'N, A POSITIVE AGENDA FOR CONSUMERS: THE FTC
YEAR IN REVIEW (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/aba/gpra2003.pdf. DOJ programs are
described in Kathleen E. McDermott, Antitrust Outreach: US. Agencies Provide Competition
Counseling to Eastern Europe, ANTITRUST, Fall/Winter 1991, at 4-7. See also INT'L COMPETITION
POLICY ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT Annex 6-A (2000),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm; Russell Pittman, Competition Policy in the United
States: The Experience and the Lessons for Transition Economies (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with Yale Journal on Regulation), http://www.worldbank.orglwbi/corpgovl
corecourse/corepdfs/BRROMACAD.pdf.
9 European programs of technical assistance are described in Juan Antonio Riviere Marti,
Competition Policy in Latin America: A New Area of Interest for the European Union, EC
COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL. (Spring 1997), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
competition/speeches/text/spI997_014_en.html.
10 Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2001).
11 The leading treatise is PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
(rev ed. 1995).
12 TRIPARTITE COMM., ORG. OF AM. STATES, REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT AND
ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION POLICY AND LAWS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 76-83 (2003).
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from that of analogous proceedings in the United States or the European
Union.
13
Professor Gal addresses Problem T chiefly in the context of "small
[developed] economies," as distinct from poor or transitional economies.
She has written a timely and readable book explaining why the
competition policies that have been adopted in smaller economies, based
on the standard U.S. and E.U. models, may not be as welfare-enhancing as
they could be. Her basic point is that U.S. antitrust law, and especially its
enforcement standards, reflects policy choices appropriate for a very large
domestic market in which economies of scale do not severely limit the
number of competitive alternatives available to most buyers. The reverse
of these conditions is found in smaller economies, developed or not, unless
they are open to trade with close neighbors. Competition policy based on
U.S. conditions may not be perfectly applicable to small economies in
which domestic competition in goods and services is heavily constrained
by production non-convexities and limited demand. In such economies, the
chief source of competitive market discipline, actual or potential, is trade.
But Professor Gal is particularly interested in countries that are
somewhat isolated from trade by boycotts, such as Israel, or by distance,
such as New Zealand. In such economies, some product markets simply
may not exist, and in others competition will not be attainable. On the
other hand, small economies with free trade, such as Belgium, are only
distinguishable from large economies by problem G, as discussed below.
Professor Gal offers a menu of alternatives to the potentially
inappropriate application of U.S. or E.U. antitrust standards and policies.
14
For example:
"Trade policy is one of the most effective tools available to small
economies for dealing with the consequences of their small size."'
15
"Small economies should strive to achieve economic efficiency as their
main goal because they cannot afford a competition policy that is
prepared to sacrifice economic efficiency for broader policy
objectives."'
16
"[S]tructural remedies to lower seller concentration should be limited
when scale economies are significant."
' 17
"[S]trict rules [against] collusive anti-competitive behavior," and, "a
13 BRUCE M. OWEN, COMPETITION POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 21 (Stanford Law Sch., John
M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 268, 2003), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.tafabstractid=456441.
14 Much is made, by some, of substantive differences in the details of enforcement
standards of U.S. and E.U. competition authorities. But these agencies, under pressure from unified
academic economic opinion, have essentially similar approaches.
15 GAL, supra note 4, at 35.
16 Id. at48.
17 Id. at53.
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strict policy ... toward exclusionary practices" are beneficial.
18
"[S]implistic rules" such as reliance on competitive forces alone, are
potentially mischievous.
19
This is good advice, of course, not only in small economies but in
large ones as well. One of Professor Gal's contributions lies in observing
that, while a large or rich economy may be able to afford inferior
competition policies, perhaps in exchange for other political goals, such
policies may be less affordable in small or poor economies.
Acknowledgement of this difference may help policy-makers in small
economies assess the implications of adopting the policies of large
economies.
Competition rules are often based on generalizations and legal
presumptions. Such legal presumptions arise from limited enforcement
budgets and the need to set clear guiding principles that go beyond the
microeconomic theory on which all competition laws are now based. It is
precisely this fact that underscores the need for different rules for small
and large economies. The marginal cases of large economies are often,
according to Professor Gal, the main cases of small economies, and thus
different presumptions should drive the law.
The heart of Professor Gal's book is three long chapters devoted,
respectively, to monopolies and essential facilities, collusive behavior, and
merger control. In these chapters, Professor Gal uses cases from the U.S.,
Europe, Israel, New Zealand, and other mostly developed jurisdictions to
illustrate basic antitrust principles and policies. None of these chapters
breaks new ground, but each addresses standard competition policy
problems in ways that are especially sensitive to the constraints not only of
markets with limited demand relative to the scale of efficient productive
units but also of jurisdictions with limited enforcement resources. What is
new here, essentially, is the application of accepted principles to the
special circumstances of small economies. Specifically, Gal argues that in
small economies greater weight should be given to economies of scale and
other efficiency defenses, and that regulation, rather than antitrust, be used
to control monopolies.
This material will be useful to antitrust enforcers anywhere, including
in the United States, that want a careful and middle-of-the-road review of
modern antitrust economics illustrated with real-world cases. It will be
especially useful to newer antitrust enforcement regimes because it does
not rely solely or uncritically on U.S. cases or U.S. policy preferences
when it comes to enforcement standards. Indeed, one must ask whether
this book is really about antitrust in "small economies," as advertised, or
18 Id. at 54.




about antitrust analysis that is reasonably sensitive both to modem
competition theory and to the conditions and characteristics of the
individual product and geographic markets to which it is applied. While
Professor Gal clearly has countries like Israel in mind, almost all of her
prescriptions are as applicable to transitional and developing economies as
to small, developed economies. In this respect, the book's title is, perhaps,
too modest. In fact, for reasons that will become clearer below, Professor
Gal's approach is no less useful even in large economies that contain
within them markets of limited geographic size.
Professor Gal's message in the end is clear enough: Competition
policy in any country must be sensitive to the economic character of the
particular product and geographic market in question. This message is not
likely to come as a surprise to the lawyers and economists who staff the
new antitrust agencies around the globe, but it needs to be understood by
the law makers and political leaders to whom they report.
Problem G: Geography
In discussing "small economies," Professor Gal, as noted above,
chiefly means countries like Israel and New Zealand-that is,
geographically small countries that are nevertheless part of the developed
world. But small economies, in the sense relevant to Professor Gal's book,
are not limited to small countries. Indeed, Professor Gal's use of the term
"economy" is potentially misleading, and not merely because the word has
no clear definition. Even the largest developed countries have small
regional economies within them-areas within which the extent of the
market for particular non-tradable goods and services is too small, relative
to the minimum efficient scale of production, to allow much competition.20
(A non-tradable good or service cannot be supplied by firms located
outside the market. Retail services provide an example.) This issue arises,
of course, in product dimensions other than the geographic, but it is
perhaps only geography that is relevant here.21 By the same token, there
are many markets in tradable goods that are larger than the largest national
economy. Automobiles and steel are examples. In these markets, domestic
producers and their workers seek protection from imports at the expense of
20 Contrast rural areas of the United States, where consumers have relatively limited
selections of retail outlets, with urban areas.
21 Every market has a geographic dimension, defined by using the hypothetical monopolist
paradigm with respect to location and transport costs. MERGER GUIDELINEs, supra note 3, § 1.2. Most
markets involve products differentiated by physical as well as geographic characteristics, and the
extent of competition among them is limited in characteristic space, as it is in geographic space, by the
density of consumer demand for the relevant characteristics in relationship to the location and scale of
efficient production units. The analogy in characteristic space of geographic legal jurisdiction is the
substantive jurisdiction of regulatory agencies, such as public utility commissions.
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domestic consumers. Countries or jurisdictions are well-defined entities,
and in antitrust analysis relevant markets are also well-defined. 22 Any
jurisdiction can be said to have an economy, but only an economy that is
largely isolated is a coherent entity by itself, and even then only for
geographic markets that extend no further than the country's borders.
Countries are jurisdictions within which antitrust enforcers have
power over economic actors. Antitrust markets are composed of the
alternatives available to consumers of a given product or service at a
particular location plus the alternatives that would become available if
current suppliers of existing alternatives were to raise their prices.
Professor Gal rightly notes, of course, that market boundaries may
coincide with political borders when those borders demarcate language or
cultural preferences, as well as trade barriers.23 What political boundaries
do usually determine, though not inevitably, is jurisdiction, so jurisdictions
and antitrust markets may not line up, especially for small economies.
Large markets may not be susceptible to effective national competition
policy, and smaller ones are in danger of neglect or, perhaps worse, dual
national and local jurisdiction. In an era of globalization, markets that are
larger than jurisdictions are a growing problem.
Wherever jurisdiction to investigate possible competition problems
may be assigned, it makes no sense to limit the analysis to part of the
market or to ignore welfare effects that fall outside the market, as
Professor Gal recognizes. Thus, essentially the same economic arguments
that support trade liberalization also support international jurisdiction over
competition problems whose effects are inter-jurisdictional. But achieving
such an outcome is even more difficult than trade liberalization. Inefficient
domestic producers and trade unions resist trade liberalization. Loss of
domestic sovereignty over antitrust enforcement adds resistance from
those who believe that antitrust law is, or ought to be, a bulwark against
the specter of foreign neo-imperialism in the guise of globalization.
There is only one logical answer to the mismatch between relevant
antitrust geographic markets and political jurisdictions: trans-national
integration of competition policy at a regional or even global scale. Even if
local antitrust analysts recognize the problem they face when markets (or
more generally, the loci of persons who receive benefits or bear costs as a
result of antitrust policy actions) do not coincide with borders, there is
nothing they can do about it, beyond seeking what may be a very obscure
second-best solution. Local laws focus on local effects in order to
22 According to the hypothetical monopolist paradigm in the Merger Guidelines, a relevant
market is "a product or group of products such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm that was the
only present and future seller of those products. . likely would impose at least a 'small but significant
and non-transitory' increase in price." Id. § 1.1 1.
23 GAL, supra note 4, at 6.
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constrain law enforcement and respect national sovereignty. Inter-
jurisdictional cooperation will not work when costs and benefits are
distributed asymmetrically across jurisdictions. Professor Gal, taking a
pragmatic view of all this, focuses simply on domestic welfare effects.
Professor Gal's focus on domestic welfare effects conforms to trends
in modem antitrust scholarship. Modem antitrust enforcement policy was
revolutionized in the last generation by its adoption of a welfare-
economics approach. It is this modem, welfare-oriented policy that has
been swept up and internalized by the newly-established competition
agencies around the world. This technology transfer was successful
because the economic principles are universal, as are some of the
investigative and screening techniques employed by U.S. and E.U. law
enforcers in the price fixing and merger analysis areas. In contrast, the case
law is not readily transferable. As U.S. case law is burdened not merely by
the unique economic context of U.S. markets but also by various
substantive flaws,24 it is probably a good thing that it is not transferable.
Even so, as Professor Gal points out, one cannot import U.S. antitrust
policies (and especially enforcement standards) as if the economic context
in every country were the same as in the United States.
There is a deeper problem with the global adoption of competition
policy modeled on U.S. antitrust technology. While U.S. federal antitrust
enforcement policy is now largely welfare-oriented, it is oriented toward
the welfare of domestic consumers. It is ambivalent at best toward
domestic producer welfare,25 and it is largely antagonistic to the economic
welfare of foreign consumers. For example, export cartels are exempted
from U.S. antitrust liability,26 and the evaluation of proposed mergers of
U.S. companies does not take into account either costs or benefits to non-
U.S. consumers.27 For this and other reasons, the adoption of domestic
24 The antitrust law of the Ninth Circuit is often mentioned in this respect. See, e.g., Herbert
Hovenkamp & Avarelle Silver-Westrick, Predatory Pricing and the Ninth Circuit, 1983 ARIz. ST. L.J.
443 (1983). For other examples, see ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF (1978). While many of Bork's examples are dated, the relatively recent Supreme Court
decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), arguably fits
this mold as well. In Kodak, because of a lack of supporting evidence, the Court rejected the standard
economic argument that sophisticated buyers would consider both original equipment costs and future
repair costs in purchasing a copier, therefore enabling Kodak to "monopolize" the "market" for it own
spare parts, despite the intense competition in the copier market. Id at 465-78.
25 This is an important issue in Schumpeterian competition, where firms compete through
innovation for the whole market.
26 Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (2001); see also Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act ("FTAIA"), 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2001).
27 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, F. Hoffmann-La
Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., No. 03-724, 2004 WL 234125, at *28 (filed Feb. 3, 2004) ("[Tjhe
central purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect consumers, competition, and commerce in the United
States." (emphasis in original)) (citing Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978)
("Congress' foremost concern in passing the antitrust laws was the protection of Americans .. ")); see
also IA PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 272h (rev. ed. 1995) ("[The
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consumer welfare as the sole objective of competition policy in every
nation around the globe is incompatible with global welfare optimization
because such policies fail to internalize economic effects that spill over
national borders.
With increased international trade and deepening economic
interdependence has come pressure for harmonization and coordination of
competition policy. This pressure arises largely from the private sector,
which fears expensive and slow parallel reviews of proposed transactions
and possible inconsistent standards and policies in other matters. As
antitrust regimes and merger notification provisions have proliferated,
there has been a growing chorus of complaints from lawyers and
executives of multinational firms about the cost and delay involved in
undertaking merger transactions. 28 Both transactions costs and delays
burden trade by increasing the costs and risks of firms participating in
international markets. In addition, domestic producers and sympathetic
officials often erect entry barriers impeding foreign producers. For this
reason, negotiations on customs unions almost always include provisions
calling for harmonization of competition policies. Analogous problems
complicate investigation and deterrence of international cartels.
One remedy for these problems lies in a supra-national coordination
mechanism or an international competition authority. The former would
reduce delays and procedural burdens, while the latter would, as in the
European Union, impinge on sovereignty. Professor Scherer urged this a
decade ago, and he was not the first.29 The World Trade Organization, for
example, has procedures responsive to the concern that local exclusionary
practices might tend to substitute for formal trade barriers in limiting entry
of competitive foreign suppliers and that such practices should be
discouraged by competition policy agencies. 30 Subsequently, there has
been great debate about international antitrust policy, especially in the
context of the successive rounds of trade talks. 31 Singh provides a recent,
FTAIA] makes clear that the concern of the antitrust laws is protection of American consumers and
American exporters, not foreign consumers or producers.").
28 See J. William Rowley & A. Neil Campbell, A Comment on the Estimated Costs of Multi-
Jurisdictional Merger Reviews, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Sept. 2003, at 1, available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/sourcelsep03/comment.pdf.
29 F. M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994).
30 See generally WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, COMPETITION POLICY, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_je/compe/comp_e.htn (last visited Mar. 26, 2004) (providing
information and links regarding the role of competition policy in the WTO).
31 See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW & SECTION OF INT'L LAW & PRACTICE, AM. BAR
ASS'N, JOINT COMMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK WORKING GROUP ON
MERGERS (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/commentsicn.html; PAUL
STEPHAN, COMPETITIVE COMPETITION LAW? AN ESSAY AGAINST INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
(Univ. of V& Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Research Paper, Working Paper No. 03-3, 2003); Pablo
Camevale, International Cooperation for Competition Agencies of Small Economies?, Address at the




well-argued case for international antitrust enforcement. 32 Others are
skeptical.3 The Doha round of talks, in spite of all this concern, has made
no serious progress on a trans-national system of antitrust enforcement,
and apparently there is little prospect for any in the future.34
What would a trans-national competition policy regime look like?
There are two operational models for trans-national antitrust policy: the
United States and the European Union. 35 These two systems strike
different balances between state and federal interests. On the issue of
geographic jurisdiction, the U.S. system gives the attorneys general of the
fifty states the same authority to investigate and take action under federal
law against any national merger, for example, as it gives the two federal
agencies. 36 Not only do individual state attorneys general have the power
to enforce federal law, and not merely in their own states, but they also
usually have state antitrust laws that may differ in some respects from
federal law. This duplicative jurisdiction can produce mischief. The state
attorneys general can and do hold up merger transactions, for example, in
order to obtain parochial concessions unrelated to competition policy.
37
They also sometimes bring antitrust actions under economic theories and
legal interpretations that are in disfavor at the national level or within
academia. In the European Union, by contrast, Brussels can preempt the
member states.38 However, some member states-notably Germany and
Great Britain-take local enforcement very seriously.39 In general, U.S.
states are less restrained than federal prosecutors by fear of setting adverse
precedents or offending proponents of economic efficiency.
The lessons from the U.S. and E.U. experience, however, is that
member states do not easily give up antitrust jurisdiction and that, where
slides on file with Yale Journal on Regulation); Frederic Jenny, International Cooperation on
Competition Policy, Address at the Conference on Hemispheric Cooperation On Competition Policy
(May 15-16, 2002) (presentation slides on file with Yale Journal on Regulation); James F. Rill & Mark
C. Schechter, Challenges Presented by Globalization to Competition Policy (June 19, 2001)
(unpublished manuscript on file with Yale Journal on Regulation).
32 Atrr SINGH, COMPETITION AND COMPETITION POLICY IN EMERGING MARKETS:
INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DIMENSIONS (Univ. of Cambridge, Econ. & Soc. Research
Council Ctr. for Bus. Research, Working Paper No. 246, 2002).
33 JOHN 0. MCGINNIS, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
HARMONIZATION (Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 03-08,
2003).
34 EDWARD SWAINE, AGAINST PRINCIPLED ANTITRUST 2-3 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Inst. for
Law and Econ., Research Paper No. 03-06, 2003).
35 On the European system, see DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH
CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS (1998).
36 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2001).
37 It is difficult to document these cases because they usually involve private or even tacit
threats and settlements. The author witnessed one such event, in which a state official withdrew a
threat seeking an antitrust injunction against a proposed merger in return for a promise to keep open a
local manufacturing facility making products unrelated to those involved in the merger.
38 See GERBER, supra note 35, at 394.
39 See id. at 413.
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jurisdiction is concurrent or "coordinated," federal and state authorities
may pursue quite different, even contradictory, goals. Most polities see
antitrust policy as too important to be left solely to international or federal
agencies. Highly visible transactions, unpopular marketing methods, and
alleged monopolists with poor public relations skills (such as Microsoft)
make attractive targets for politically ambitious local prosecutors. Neither
in the United States nor in the European Union are member states'
jurisdictions limited to markets wholly within their borders. This is not a
satisfactory model for an international approach to competition policies
affecting producers or consumers in multiple countries.
40
An interesting question for future research is whether the infeasibility
of an appropriate trans-national forum in competition matters affecting
multiple jurisdictions justifies, as a second-best policy, multiple local
jurisdictions each ignoring the external effects of its policies. Of course,
just as in the United States and the European Union, a preference for
federalism is likely to lead to some degree of dual jurisdiction between any
international agency and national or local authorities. But such an outcome
is unlikely to lead to worse effects than having national authorities put
effectively negative weight on the welfare of foreign consumers.
Problem L: The Law
The foregoing suggests that antitrust policy in a jurisdiction of any
size should be tested against a somewhat more general standard than the
normal but modest one tacitly accepted by Professor Gal--essentially,
whether it makes sense in the market in question. More importantly,
antitrust is but one of a range of policy instruments, including virtually all
of what we call civil and criminal law, that can be used to mitigate market
failures. In this Section I will leave Professor Gal's book temporarily to
one side because it does not address developing economies, even though
40 While considerations of political sovereignty are likely to remain an insurmountable
barrier to true integration of competition policy, nevertheless there exist efforts to exchange non-
sensitive information and experience. For example, the International Competition Network describes
its functions, on its website, as follows:
The International Competition Network (ICN) provides antitrust agencies from
developed and developing countries with a focused network for addressing
practical antitrust enforcement and policy issues of common concern. It facilitates
procedural and substantive convergence in antitrust enforcement through a results-
oriented agenda and informal, project-driven organization.
The ICN brings international antitrust enforcement into the 21st century. By
enhancing convergence and cooperation, the ICN promotes more efficient,
effective antitrust enforcement worldwide. Consistency in enforcement policy and
elimination of unnecessary or duplicative procedural burdens stands [sic] to
benefit consumers and businesses around the globe.
International Competition Network, Homepage, available at
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2004).
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they are, of course, "small." Neglecting to understand and account for the
effects of law on economic incentives is far more tragic in developing
economies than in countries that have grown rich on fortunate but
unintended compatibilities between law and economic growth, where the
neglect is merely academic.
In the developing world, the failure of the economic system to deliver
a decent standard of living to most of the humans on the planet appears to
be traceable in significant part to the absence of decentralized, unregulated
markets, and especially competitive markets. These economic failures
probably show us what any economy, including that of a developed nation,
would look like absent effective legal institutions that reduce risk and
uncertainty, internalize externalities, and align individual incentives with
the conditions for efficiency and growth.
The revolutionary global market reforms of the 1990s, made possible
by the collapse of the only rival economic model, have begun slowly to
change this situation. But markets do not operate perfectly. The
improvements brought by competitive markets also bring costly
dislocations, and people understandably use political tools at their disposal
to resist being subjected to competitive pressures and costly adjustments.
Economic policy interventions in markets become not just useful but
inevitable.
The economic learning that underpins modern antitrust policy has
broad relevance that extends beyond cartels and monopolists. It is equally
useful in managing externalities through the operation of environmental
and land use law, in deciding how to enforce contractual arrangements, in
mitigating the consequences of asymmetric information and opportunism,
in creating or enhancing investment incentives, in designing incentive-
compatible regulatory regimes, and in implementing a range of other
patches and inoculations of markets riddled with real world imperfections.
Understanding how and when to apply these patches requires the same
skills as modern antitrust analysis, largely because an understanding of and
faith in competitive markets are key ingredients of successful policies and
laws compatible with efficient incentives.4'
41 Because of this, antitrust professionals may do far more good advocating competitive
market solutions to economic problems throughout the government than if they limit themselves to
antitrust enforcement. The experience of the United States in this respect is quite instructive. There
have been startling improvements in the competitive performance of those regulated industries, such as
securities exchanges, transportation, and telecommunications, where the Antitrust Division advocated
competitive market solutions early and often, starting around 1970. In contrast, regulated industries
where the Antitrust Division advocated competitive solutions later or on a more limited scale, such as
electricity generation and transmission, have improved their performance much more slowly.
Competition advocacy has been a key, perhaps a necessary, ingredient in the successful deregulation of
large sectors of the U.S. economy. For a recent discussion of the competition advocacy programs of
the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission, see ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL ch.5 (3d ed. 1998), available at
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Whatever else it may be about, law is about economic incentives. It is
widely believed that Western legal systems have promoted economic
growth;42 certainly they have not prevented growth. There are some clear
examples of how this works. We know that where well-defined and readily
transferable private property rights exist, markets work more effectively.
We have as supporting evidence the collapse of the socialist economies of
the former Soviet Bloc as well as the failures of many utopian experiments
elsewhere. Similarly, the invention of the limited liability company, which
required grudging changes in legal institutions, promoted greater
efficiencies of scale in manufacturing and commerce.43
The general mechanism by which these legal structures affect
economic activity is no mystery. A person who expects the state to protect
his right to retain the rewards of his efforts or investment works harder or
invests more than one who does not have such expectations. The same is
true if a person expects the state to protect her human rights, such as
freedom from racial discrimination or arbitrary confinement, because that
increases the returns to her investments in human capital. A person is less
likely to invest in an enterprise over which she has little managerial control
if all her personal assets are at risk than if only her investment is at risk.
A society that uses law to remedy market imperfections must
recognize that law enforcement has its own costs, and these costs dictate
that most of the welfare-enhancing effects of law be felt as incentives
rather than controls. Controls are generally too expensive and require too
much information. In the criminal law, incentive effects underlie the well-
known concept of optimal deterrence. In civil law, using law as a remedy
for market failure in torts, contracts, and property requires close attention
to the Coase theorem, so that rights, created to internalize all external
economic effects, are assigned initially to efficient holders, in the likely
event that transactions costs are significant. Efficient laws create
incentives compatible with efficient decisions by economic agents that are
based on agents' expectations regarding the future behavior of courts and
other law enforcement institutions.44
Incentives compatible with productivity and investment are a
http://www.usdoj.gov:80/atr/foia/divisionmanual/ch5.pdf. See also Timothy J. Muris, Creating a
Culture of Competition: The Essential Role of Competition Advocacy, Address at the International
Competition Network (Sept. 28, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris
/020928naples.htm.
42 See, e.g., NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 2.
43 See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE CoMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY
OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 46-49 (2003) (describing the development of the limited liability concept
in Great Britain and the United States in the nineteenth century from a legal and economic
perspective).
44 See RicHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 267 (6th ed. 2003) ("The primary




necessary ingredient in economic growth.45 All economic decisions are
based on expectations, because most of the consequences of decisions lie
in the future and nothing can be certain in the future. The economic role of
the law is, in many cases, to facilitate prediction by reducing uncertainty.
If a promisor breaches in circumstances for which the contract is silent, the
promisee will have remedies that are more clearly defined and thus more
certain under contract law than in its absence. In other cases, the law
perfects economic interests in the results of economic activity. Time and
money invested in education or training cannot be destroyed by
discriminatory employment practices or unjust imprisonment. There are
many other examples. What they have in common are substantive legal
rules compatible with economically efficient incentives and a
corresponding understanding, based on belief and experience, of the
likelihood that the law will be applied and enforced. It does not matter
what the substance of the law is if no one expects it to be enforced or if it
is subject to easy and frequent change. Economically efficient law thus
requires not merely substantive soundness but also the effective
management of expectations, which are often achieved through procedural
norms.
Antitrust is an easy case for the application of these principles.
Antitrust law deals chiefly with price fixing, monopoly, and increased
concentration through merger, in essence behavior that drives inefficient
wedges between prices and marginal costs. If we ignore its populist and
redistributive motivations, as it is today fashionable to do, antitrust law is
the paradigm of a legal approach to correcting or at least mitigating a
particular species of market failure.
Even if antitrust has the same competition-promoting and efficiency
objectives from one country or "economy" to another, both the substantive
laws and the enforcement standards must differ in order to conform to the
differing factors affecting local agent incentives and, no less important, to
reflect the differences in the legal systems. 46 In the United States a federal
prosecutor considering whether to bring a particular antitrust case before a
court will consider the merits of the case: whether the necessary facts can
be proved, whether there is an appropriate remedy, whether the case is the
most effective use of scarce budget dollars, and so forth. But in addition,
the prosecutor will consider the effects of bringing or not bringing the case
45 This requirement is discussed from a number of angles in WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS' ADVENTURES AND MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS
(2002).
46 Gal argues, as noted above, that small economies are less able than large ones to afford
non-efficiency objectives in antitrust. This is correct but understates the point. It is very difficult to find
philosophical justifications for the sacrifice of efficiency (and therefore consumer welfare) in pursuit
of other goals, no matter what the size of the economy. See generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).
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on two other very important matters. These matters are, first, how the case
will affect the expectations of non-party economic agents with respect to
future enforcement actions and the resulting change in agent incentives;
and second, how the case will affect the law itself if the case is won or lost.
Such considerations are often dispositive, and rightly so. Indeed, if there is
a choice between the "correct" outcome of a proceeding, viewed narrowly
in terms of the welfare of the parties, and the establishment of "correct"
incentives for non-parties based on the outcome of the matter, economic
analysis strongly favors the latter "correctness" over the former.
If we assume for the sake of argument that U.S. antitrust laws and
enforcement standards are economically optimal for the U.S. economy and
the U.S. legal system, it follows that U.S. antitrust laws and standards
almost certainly are not optimal for every other country. Even if the
business environment and other relevant circumstances were the same in
other countries as in the United States, legal systems are sui generis. For
example, if we assume the treble damage remedy in U.S. antitrust law for
price fixing victims yields exactly the correct level of deterrence for U.S.
price fixers, it is quite likely to be entirely inappropriate in Gondwanaland,
where all judges are understood to be corrupt, as well as in other countries
for other reasons.47 Similarly, antitrust doctrines based on assumptions
about the computational limitations of U.S. civil courts, such as Illinois
Brick v. Illinois,48 may be inappropriate in a country that relies instead on
antitrust enforcement by an expert agency utilizing administrative law.
What is also remarkable about discussions of antitrust policy in any
jurisdiction is that they are often conducted as if all economic actors will
adhere to the law, such that the sole requirement for successful antitrust
policy is a sensible set of statutes and enforcement standards. But a law to
which everyone adheres, like a law to which no one adheres, is almost
certainly either a bad law or a good law badly enforced. Enforcement has
costs, and enforcement decisions are made on imperfect information. The
47 There is, in fact, very little basis to believe that either the treble-damage remedy or the
current level of enforcement effort "optimizes" the incidence of price fixing or other antitrust
violations in the United States. For certain other crimes, household surveys reveal estimates of non-
reported crime, but no one has estimated either the frequency of undetected price fixing or, equally
important, the incidence of welfare-enhancing behavior inadvertently deterred by fear of erroneous
antitrust liability. A 1993 "leniency program," instituted to encourage reporting of price fixing by
participants, apparently was unexpectedly successful, suggesting a high degree of previously
undeterred cartel activity. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2001 STATUS REPORT: CORPORATE LENIENCY
PROGRAM (May 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/criminal/8278.pdf. The Antitrust
Division Corporate Leniency Program is described in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY
PROGRAM (1993), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelineslencorp.htm; Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Gary R. Spratling, U.S. Dept. of Justice, The Corporate Leniency Policy: Answers to
Recurring Questions, Remarks at the 1998 Spring Meeting of the ABA Antitrust Section (Apr. 1,
1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1626.htm.
48 431 U.S. 720, 736-48 (1977) (barring downstream customers' recovery of treble damages




same is true of decisions to adhere to a law. It follows that there will, with
respect to any law, be an optimal degree of unlawful agent behavior. The
management of this tradeoff between enforcement decisions (including
enforcement expenditures) and the resulting costs of unlawful behavior is
complex and necessarily feeds back on the choice of substantive law,
because some kinds of laws can be enforced with greater clarity, creating
better-defined and more certain agent expectations, than others. An
obvious example is the comparison of a law that gives judges no discretion
in criminal sentencing with one that gives judges broad discretion. In
antitrust law, a good example is the FTC/DOJ Merger Guidelines, which
increase the precision with which private parties can predict how the
government will exercise its prosecutorial discretion.
Professor Gal addresses these problems in the sense that she
emphasizes the importance of taking into account the extent of the market
relative to efficient scale and other such economic matters that vary by
country. She does not, however, consider the differences among
jurisdictions in the relationship between courts or administrative agencies
and the formation of expectations among economic agents. This is a
significant omission.
Professor Gal is hardly alone in neglecting the microeconomic
process by which law influences behavior. A great effort has been under
way for the past decade to export not only U.S. antitrust law but whole
sectors of U.S. and European commercial and civil law to the so-called
transition economies of Eastern Europe and the poor nations of the
developing world, as noted above.49 Many leading academics, lawyers, and
economists have worked hard on these efforts, and substantial support has
come from international development agencies and unilateral donors. This
effort is based in large part on the statistical correlation that appears to
exist between "good institutions"--in other words, the rule of law-and
successful development.50 The effort is not based, generally speaking, on a
close examination of the ways in which it would be useful for economic
agents to behave and on how laws and law enforcement might influence
agents' incentives to those ends. Of course, it is far easier to export
Western law than to design new laws more sensitive to local conditions or
to consider more effective ways of implementing indigenous laws.
Antitrust is but one example of a persistent blindness of legal scholars
49 Discussion of this effort and citations may be found at LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY, WORLD
BANK GROUP, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM: STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS 25-54 (2003), available at
http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/leglr/GreyBookFinal2003.pdf.
50 See WILLIAM EASTERLY & Ross LEVINE, TROPICS, GERMS, AND CROPS: How
ENDOWMENTS INFLUENCE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. w9106, 2002), http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9106.pdf; DANI RODRIK ET AL., INSTITUTIONS
RULE: THE PRIMACY OF INSTITUTIONS OVER GEOGRAPHY AND INTEGRATION IN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (Ctr. for Int'l Dev. at Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 97, 2002).
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and economic development specialists alike to the central role of law in
channeling the behavior of all those who are never touched directly by it.
Basic human rights have strong deontological justifications, for example,
but their chief welfare effect may depend on the link between increased
personal security and stronger savings and investment incentives,
especially in human capital formation. High-level principles will do little
or no economic good-that is, they will not reduce poverty or other
miseries-if they do not work their way down to a change in the
expectations and therefore the incentives of agents. A statute may be
enacted or a constitution amended with no effect whatever on the
economic well-being of the people.
Much of the recent transfer of law from developed nations to
developing and transitional nations has been the mere adoption of poorly
understood and almost certainly inappropriate statutes (and constitutions).
Little or no attention has been paid to the likely effects, if any, they have
on the expectations, and therefore the incentives, of people. This is sloppy
work because the problems are tractable. Expectations themselves can,
albeit with difficulty, be measured. For example, survey techniques can
determine whether men and women expect a new statute protecting
women's rights to be enforced by local courts. It is these expectations, not
the substance of the law, that determine the law's effects, if any, on
domestic violence or sex discrimination in employment. Incentives, while
not directly observable, lead to changes in economic behavior, which also
can be measured on a micro level.51 It is not difficult to imagine ways in
which the analytical and empirical tools of social science could assess in a
particular context the effectiveness of different substantive laws and
different combinations of enforcement and publicity aimed at achieving
specified goals, such as a shift from child labor to increased school
attendance.
Thus, it may be more cost-effective to provide for the predictable
enforcement of existing imperfect indigenous laws than to introduce new
ones. The effect of introducing a new law, abstracting from substance,
tends merely to reinforce the jaded view that formal laws have little
relationship to reality and are thus easily changed to suit the current
fashion in donor preferences or elite interests. No one rationally changes
expectations on the basis of laws so easily and frequently changed.
Similarly, mere statutes do not protect rights in the face of jury or judicial
lawlessness, which undermines efficient incentives to develop rights in the
first place.
51 For an example of such a study, based on an examination of legal aid clinics for poor
women in Ecuador, see BRUCE M. OWEN & PABLO PORTILLO, LEGAL REFORM, EXTERNALITIES AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: MEASURING THE IMPACT OF LEGAL AID ON POOR WOMEN IN ECUADOR
(Stanford Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 255, 2003).
Vol. 21:441, 2004
Imported Antitrust
Further, even a well-designed law that is enforced predictably can
have little effect on general expectations and incentives if credible
information about it is not readily available to the public, either directly or
through opinion leaders and professional intermediaries. Thus, again, it
may turn out to be more cost-effective to design and implement credible
means of disseminating accurate information about existing law and law
enforcement than to reform the laws themselves. In short, there are
economic tradeoffs among these inputs into the process of creating
incentives more compatible with economic efficiency and growth. It is
surely wrong and even irresponsible to put all the emphasis on the
intellectual substance of the law, while neglecting its effects on the
majority of people whose chief purpose it is to affect-all those who never
meet a prosecutor or see the inside of a civil courtroom.
The problems of Tailoring, Geography, and Law stand between all
the world's people and those improvements in their welfare that can be
achieved through competitive global markets. While problems G and L are
not at all unique to competition policy, and Professor Gal is in good
company in ignoring them, the future success of both competition policy
and other legal reforms intended to support competitive markets and
development depends critically on greater attention to the details of
jurisdiction and of influencing economic behavior by changing
expectations. The latter is far from being a revolutionary idea. As Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. put it more than a century ago, "The prophecies of
what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I
mean by the law."52 These prophecies are the levers by which law
influences economic behavior, for good or ill.
52 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897).

